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GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: REVIEW AND REMEDY
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS IN INDIANA
There has been a dearth of litigation by poor people1 challenging
denials of aid by locally funded and administered general assistance
programs.' One reason for this lack of litigation has been the mistaken
belief that state judicial review4 of administrative decisions in the wel-
fare field is virtually nonexistent. Although this note will focus on the
availability of review and possible remedies within Indiana's general
assistance program, the implications of this analysis are national in
scope.'
1. There are no precise definitions as to who is a "poor person," though there has
been a great deal written about different means of determining who is poor. See J. IKR-
sHAWv, GOVERNMENT AGAINST POVERTY 5-18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KERSHAWI;
Spilerman & Elesh, Alternative Conceptions of Poverty and Their Implications for In-
colne Maintenance, 18 SOCIAL PROB. 358-67 (1971). The leading Indiana case on this
definitional point says that "poor person" and "indigent person" are synonymous. Park-
view Memorial Hosp. v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 134 Ind. App. 689, 695, 191
N.E.2d 116, 119 (1963).
2. There are no reported cases in Indiana in which a poor person has sued a trustee
for relief. The single unreported case of which the writer is cognizant, Fry v. Stevenson,.
No. E-8134 (St. Joseph [Ind.] Super. Ct., Apr. 7, 1971), is not relevant to the matters
here discussed. The statutes outlining the general assistance program are IND. CODE §§
12-2-1-1 to 12-2-1-39 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-144 to 52-181 (1964).
The general assistance program is completely financed by money raised at the lower
levels of government. The administrators of the general assistance program are spe-
cifically exempt from regulation by the state. IND. CODE § 12-1-20-1 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 52-176a (1964).
3. One of the reasons why the poor may have failed to seek judicial relief in the
past was the unavailability of lawyers willing to represent the indigent. Now that legal
service programs are widely available the continued lack of cases necessitates other
explanations. The most logical is that welfare recipients are hesitant to challenge a
caseworker or a trustee for fear of earning his permanent enmity. Handler, Controlling
Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 494 (1966).
Often the only people who will challenge a welfare administrator in court are those
who have been denied admittance to a program of benefits and have nothing to lose by
the challenge. Id. at 496.
4. This note will concentrate on state judicial review. There is always the possi-
bility of federal review. See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 Colu. L. REv. 84 (1967).
5. The traditions of general assistance programs are similar throughout the nation,
because they have a common base in the English poor laws.
• . . [P]ublic assistance has survived with a set of creaky traditions intact
that may help explain the system's present condition. The traditions include
repression, local financing and administration, a minimization of the amount of
money spent on the poor, an emphasis on the work ethic, a distinction between
the deserving and the undeserving poor, and a stigma attached to those who are
dependent on relief. All these are interrelated; none are independent of the
others.
B. ST=, ON RELIEF 43 (1971).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW
The administrators of general assistance programs in Indiana are
township trustees.6 Three major roadblocks prevent judicial review of
their decisions. The first obstacle stems from the traditional notion that
a mandamus action,' the procedural vehicle most typically used in welfare
cases, was available only when a public official failed to perform a duty to
give aid.' This was particularly true if the official had any statutory
powers of discretion as to eligibility determinations.9 But traditional
notions are eroding.
In Washington Township v. Parkview Memorial Hospital,0 the
Indiana Appellate 'Court found a statutory duty to aid the poor in need
of medical services and granted review despite its implicit acknowledge-
ment that the statute in question gave the administrator great discretion
in regard to eligibility determinations. Parkvziew certainly discredits the
theory that "discretionary" decisions are non-reviewable in that the court
specifically reversed a trustee's determination that the claimant did not
fulfill the statutory requirements. The court reasoned that the trustee's
decision that such requirements had not been met did not negate his
statutory duty to provide aid if subsequent review revealed an abuse of
discretion."
While the Parkview court appeared specifically to tie review to a
failure to exercise a statutory duty, one implication of its reasoning is that
an abuse of discretion will always support review.' A recognition that
6. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-1 (1971), IND. ANx. STAT. § 52-144 (1964).
7. Mandamus is an order commanding an official to perform a duty he has refused
to carry out. It is an extraordinary remedy and, as such, is not available if an adequate
remedy exists at law. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 176-77
(1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
8. Id. at 181.
9. Id.
10. - Ind. App. -, 246 N.E.2d 391 (1969). In this case, the hospital recovered
14,000 dollars from a township trustee for medical services rendered a deceased indigent
who had previously been denied relief.
11. The court found in this case that the trustee had never made an eligibility de-
termination. This conclusion is difficult to support since the court found as facts that
the trustee's wife, as his agent, received effective notice of the applicant's request, made
a "brief inquiry" into the applicant's eligibility and informed the applicant's husband
that she would not qualify. Id. at -, 246 N.E.2d at 395. If the court truly believed no
decision had been made. its logical reaction would have been a remand.
12. The duty of the trustee to provide medical and hospital care for poor per-
sons is mandatory. There is no room for discretion once the determination is
made. . . . No such determination was ever made in this case.
Id. at -, 246 N.E.2d at 394. Thus, Parkview ties review and remedy to a showing
that duty is required once the discretionary decision as to eligibility is made. But in this
case the court, and not the trustee, purportedly made the discretionary decision-a very
unusual situation. Transcending the fiction of non-determination, the court is really
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abuse of discretion, absent any statutory duty, will lead to review was
made earlier in State ex rel. Smitherman v. Davis1" where the Indiana
Supreme Court did not limit judicial review to a showing of a "prima
facie mandatory duty."' 4 In addition, Smither-man recognized that an
abuse of discretion by the official involved will give rise to review even
if the statute contained no duty at all. The majority stated:
[O]ur courts have held that although the language of the
statute is permissive in form, maldng the action of a public
official discretionary, nevertheless where there has been an abuse
of such discretion courts will review the exercise of such
discretionary powers and compel proper discharge of the duties
imposed. 5
If courts are willing to give relief where there has been an abuse of
discretion, they must be willing to review every case of alleged abuse.
Such a policy leads to extensive judicial review.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presents a
second obstacle to judicial review. Indiana subscribes to this doctrine. 6
Although the exhaustion doctrine is usually justifiable, its validity be-
comes questionable in emergency situations. This fact has been recognized
in a New York decision establishing a right to emergency assistance.Y
saying that the trustee's "discretion" is not so broad as to give him complete freedom.
This is really not surprising since even "discretionary" decisions must be made within a
sphere of valid choices:
Discretion is the power usually given by statute to make a choice among com-
peting considerations. Most powers to act involve some elements of choice if
only as to detail. On the other hand, nearly all powers to act, however numerous
and broad the considerations relevant to choice, exclude and deny the legality of
other elements as facts of choice. . . . It has, for example, been said that
however broad the discretion of government personnel officers in hiring and
firing, certain bases of action would violate both the Constitution and the as-
sumed statutory terms of reference. . . . [T]he fact that there may be dis-
cretionary elements present does not, or at least should not, exclude judicial
review, whether by mandamus or other appropriate remedy, where legally irrele-
vant or forbidden considerations have determined the decision.
JAFFE, supra note 7, at 181.
13. 238 Ind. 563, 151 N.E.2d 495 (1958). In response to a complaint asking that
school officials be commanded to grant the transfer requests of pupils, the court found
that the complaint alleged an abuse of discretion sufficient to withstand demurrer.
14. Id. at 571, 151 N.E.2d at 498.
15. Id. at 569, 151 N.E.2d at 497-98.
16. Wilmont v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 48 N.E.2d 649 (1943) ; Culbertson v.
Board of Comm'rs, 208 Ind. 22, 194 N.E. 638 (1935). In general assistance cases there
is a statutory procedure for administrative review by the county commissioners. Pub. L.
No. 168, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 676, formerly IND. CODE § 12-2-1-18 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 52-160 (1964).
17. In Ross v. Barbaro, 61 Misc.2d 147, 304 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1969), a welfare recipi-
ent who had been robbed of the proceeds of her welfare check (her family's sole support
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Although there are no reported cases concerning an emergency
exception to the exhaustion doctrine, Indiana courts have developed
another exception to this requirement. The exception was formulated
in Jackson School Township v. State ex rel. Garrison,"s where the court
found exhaustion necessary only in cases involving purely discretionary
decisions. 9
A third obstacle to review may have been created by Smitherman.
Limiting language in the opinion stated that only administrative acts
"which directly and substantially affect the lives and property of the
public"2 are reviewable. Although no prior case law supports this
limitation,2 this language could undermine extensive review in the
welfare field because township trustees may argue that one individual's
claim does not substantially affect the public interest.
Even if this substantial public interest limitation is valid, compelling
reasons can be put forward to demonstrate that suits against township
trustees satisfy the requirements of any such test. The denial of assistance
on the local level means, in effect, that the individual will receive no aid
whatsoever since a suit against the township trustee is an applicant's last
opportunity for aid.22 It follows, therefore, that such important and final
decisions should be within the scope of judicial review. This is not to
urge that the public interest is served by simply granting aid to any
for the month) was held entitled to emergency assistance, regardless of whether the
commissioner could obtain reimbursement from the state.
18. 204 Ind. 251, 183 N.E. 657 (1933).
19. Id. at 267, 183 N.E. at 663. The court also found that exhaustion was not
necessary where there existed "a clear legal duty on the part of the defendants to per-
form the thing demanded." Id.
20. 238 Ind. at 569, 151 N.E.2d at 498.
21. S-nitherinan cites four cases as supporting this limitation: Slentz v. Fort
Wayne, 233 Ind. 226, 118 N.E.2d 484 (1954) ; Phillips v. Officials of City, 233 Ind. 414,
120 N.E.2d 398 (1954) ; Smith v. Lippman, 222 Ind. 261, 53 N.E.2d 157 (1944) ; Coleman
v. Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942). However, all four cases speak simply in
terms of abuse leading to review. Beyond these four cases, there is no apparent support
for any such public interest limitation. See Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative
Agencies in Indiana, 28 IND. L.J. 1, 19 (1952). Since the public interest limitation had
no Indiana precedent, the Sinitherman court placed reliance on Board of Supervisors v.
United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 435 (1867) ; United States ex rel. Harriman Nat'l Bank
v. Caplinger, 18 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1927).
In spite of its questionable heritage, the Indiana Supreme Court has invoked the
limitation twice since Smitherman, Gierhart v. State, 243 Ind. 553, 186 N.E2d 680
(1962) ; Orbison v. Welsh, 242 Ind. 385, 179 N.E.2d 727 (1961). The Indiana Appellate
Court has employed the test on one occasion. Wright v. Kinnard, - Ind. App. -, 245
N.E.2d 835, 843 (1969).
22. It must not be forgotten that in most cases public assistance represents
the last resource of those bereft of any alternative.
Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), prob. jiuis. nwted, 397 U.S.
903, vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
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applicant, but rather is served by making certain that no qualified person
is denied aid by an abuse of administrative discretion.
It may be further shown that an individual's suit against a trustee
fulfills the requirements of the substantial public interest test by exain-
ing the cases cited by Smitherman in support of this limitation." While
none of these cases actually contained limiting language about "substantial
public interest," they all dealt with an abuse by a public agency or
political entity. Indiana courts, therefore, may rely on these cases as
precedent for the proposition that the public or political nature of the
defendant, such as a township trustee, is sufficient to establish a sub-
stantial public interest.
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Discretionary powers do not negate the possibility of judicial review,
but they may present great problems as far as the ease and availability of
remedies are concerned. The ability of a court to grant a suitable remedy
depends, in large part, upon the clarity of the statutory guidelines which
control the trustee's discretion as to eligibility determinations. These
guidelines may take one of three forms. First, the guidelines may be
explicit and clearly indicate which criteria are most important. Such
guidelines present the best chance for achieving a satisfactory remedy
since courts can easily determine whether or not they were correctly
applied by the trustee. Unfortunately, very few Indiana statutes provide
such guidelines.2"
Second, guidelines may be explicit as to a given standard but vague
as to how this standad is met. For example, one typical standard is
"need."25 However, the criteria for determining "need," though some-
times listed, 8 often give no insight as to which criteria should be given
23. See note 21 supra.
24. Though the Indiana statutes sometimes provide an abstract guideline (see note
25 infra), they very rarely indicate criteria of practical importance in arriving at deci-
sion (see note 26 infra).
25. Public aid by an overseer of the poor may include and shall be extended
only when the personal effort of the applicant fails to provide one (1) or more
of the following items: Food, including prepared food, clothing, shelter, light,
water, fuel for heating and cooking, household supplies which shall include first
aid and medical supplies for minor injury and illness, household necessities
which shall include basic and essential items of furniture and utensils, heating
and cooking stoves, and transportation to seek and accept employment.
Pub. L. No. 168, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 676, formerly IND. CODE § 12-2-1-10 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-160 (1964).
26. Among the criteria for determining need is the level of support from relatives.
If the poor persons applying for township aid have relatives able to assist them
vho are living in the township, it shall be the duty of the overseer, before giving
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primary consideration. Whenever objective criteria for eligibility deter-
minations are absent or unweighted, a court will be hesitant to impose
its unsupported and largely subjective determinations upon a trustee.
Usually only the availability of some weighted guidelines will persuade
the court to do so. An example of a method objectively defining "need"
is the set of criteria used by the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO),2" under which aid is afforded to all whose income is less than a
multiple of a minimum food budget. Strong justification exists for use of
OEO standards in Indiana since food necessities are listed as one of the
state's basic statutory criteria when trustee responsibilities are described. 8
The third form of statutory guidelines are those which are vague or
nonexistent. The susceptibility of vagueness to constitutional attack has
been well documented.2" One of the major reasons that courts will not
tolerate vagueness is the likelihood of arbitrary decisions by government
officials and administrators."0 This possibility is particularly serious in
general assistance programs, given their historical traditions."'
The need for ascertainable standards in welfare cases was specifically
recognized in Holmes v. New York City Public Housing Authority. 2
In that case, the city of New York was receiving 90,000 family applica-
tions a year for 10,000 family openings in their public housing program.
A preference group was established which included families already
doubled up. Members of the non-preference group brought a claim
alleging deprivation of due process since the Housing Authority had
not adopted standards for allocating housing among them. In stressing
the importance of guidelines in welfare cases, the Second Circuit stated:
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and
aid a second time, to call on such relatives of the poor persons and ask them to
help their poor relatives, either with material relief or by furnishing them
with employment.
IND. CODE § 12-2-1-11 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-153 (1964). It is never made clear
how distant a relationship must be before aid can be withheld on the basis of possible
support from relatives.
27. See KERSHAW, supra note 1, at 10. OEO guidelines determine a basic food
budget and then assume that food expenditures absorb one-third of total family income.
Based on these calculations the poverty line figures in 1968 were 1,635 dollars for one
person, 3,335 dollars for four and 4,910 dollars for seven or more.
28. See note 25 supra.
29. While it is well recognized that vagueness will not be tolerated in the criminal
law the need for precise guidelines has been extended even to the licensing field. Hornsby
v. Allen 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). This area is closely analogous to the granting of
welfare. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
30. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
31. See note 5 supra.
32. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
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uncontrolled discretion in an agency of government vested
with the administration of a vast program, such as public
housing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse."3
The Second Circuit did not stop, however, after finding a lack of
standards intolerable. The court went on to suggest that discretion,
which may easily turn into discrimination, 4 should be kept to a minimum
when the destitute are involved.
Equitable considerations also favor the result reached by the
district judge. The 31 named plaintiffs speak not only for
themselves, but also for thousands of New York's neediest who
may have been unfairly entrenched in squalor due to the alleged
inadequacies of the Authority's procedure."
Without any necessity for mentioning "equitable considerations," the
Second Circuit, nonetheless, explicitly allowed equitable rhetoric like
"entrenched in squalor" to influence its decision to narrow the acceptable
limits of administrative discretion. Thus, there is precedent for courts
allowing a narrower range of legitimate discretionary choices when the
claims of the poor are being considered.
Given the fact that courts will not tolerate vague guidelines, two
possible solutions are evident. The first would allow each trustee to
interpret statutes his own way. 6 This approach, however, is dependent
on adminsistrative action that may never come."7 Moreover, to allow
each trustee to elucidate rules would lead to confusion and inconsistent
results. The desirability of uniform guidelines leads to a second possibility
-the judicial application of a standard for the entire state. It is possible
for courts to create and enforce interim guidelines until acceptable alter-
33. Id. at 265.
34. Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may
mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reason-
ableness or arbitrariness.
K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTICE 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
35. 398 F.2d at 268.
36. DAvis, soura note 34, at 55:
When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful stand-
ards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time, and
then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion
through principles and rules.
37. The typical failure in our system that is correctible is not legislative dele-
gation of broad discretionary power with vague standards, it is the procrastina-




natives are adopted by either the legislature or the administrative agency
itself. There is precedent for this approach in Miranda v. Arizona :38
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended
to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting rights of the individual while promoting efficient
enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and assuring
a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards
must be observed.. . 9
The relevant inquiry, therefore, may be not whether courts have
the power to set interim guidelines in welfare cases, but rather what
guidelines should be employed. More is needed than a mere transfer of
vague discretionary power from the trustee to the court. The Indiana
legislature has acknowledged the need for more specific guidelines in a
newly amended statute which charges the Board of County Commis-
sioners, in passing on appeals, with the duty to:
. . .be guided by uniform relief standards of eligibility and
need established by or for the township trustee as overseer of
the poor for the granting of poor relief in his township. If
no such standards have been established, the Board and its
hearing officers shall be guided by the circumstances in each
case.
40
Unfortunately, while this statute recognizes the need for uniform stan-
dards, it may be self-defeating in that it also gives the Board power to
use a case by case approach in the absence of guidelines. The legality of
such broad power, however, is questionable in light of an apparent
delegation of authority that may lead to vague or nonexistent guidelines.
Even if that part of the statute authorizing a case-by-case approach
will not stand constitutional scrutiny, the portion of the statute calling for
"uniform relief standards" would likely stand as it suffers from no
apparent constitutional deficiency.4 If this part of the statute does
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Id. at 467.
40. Pub. L. No. 168, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 676, formerly IND. CODE § 12-2-1-18
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-160 (1964).
41. The statute contains no specific severability clause, but the absence of such a
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stand, the requirement of a "uniform" standard is a compelling argument
in favor of temporary judicial formulation and implementation of such
guidelines. Courts might be strongly influenced by OEO guidelines or
some other well recognized standard, since these standards have a rational
and clear empirical foundation.
CONCLUSION
Indiana law presents no artificial bar to judicial review -of welfare
administration. The township trustee's shelter from review provided by
the umbrella of discretion can be pierced by showing either a duty or an
abuse of discretion. Where statutes provide only vague or nonexistent
guidelines, courts may be able to prescribe and enforce interim standards.
In light of this fact and in order to best serve the interests of justice,
courts should be willing to review and remedy alleged abuses of
administrative action.
RICHARD A. DEAN
clause means nothing. What is necessary is to see if the rest of the statute has meaning
absent the questionable sentence. Here the basic thrust of the statute is in direction of
uniform guidelines. Striking the sentence authorizing decisions without guidelines cer-
tainly does not negate the purpose of the statute. If anything, the omission of this
sentence makes the statute clearer.
